Overview

The American planners based their strategy for the invasion of Iwo Jima—codenamed “Operation DETACHMENT”—on incomplete information. U.S. intelligence reported that there were only around 13,000 Japanese on Iwo Jima. There were nearly twice that number.

The Allies wanted to keep pressure on the Japanese in hopes of winning a series of victories that would force Japan to surrender. With this in mind, strategists expected a swift seizure of Iwo Jima, planning to take the island in only a week. Then they could move on to the larger invasion of Okinawa.

The struggle for Iwo Jima lasted 36 days.

Because the recapture of the Philippines was happening at the same time, there were fewer ships to spare for the preinvasion bombardment of Iwo Jima. The Marines asked for ten days but were only granted three. Bad weather just before the invasion reduced even this to about a day and a half. What the Americans did not and could not have known was that the Japanese defenses and tactics were vastly different for this battle than they had been the rest of the war. This would be very costly for everyone involved.

  • Three-Dimensional Rubber Map of Iwo Jima

  • Three-Dimensional Rubber Map of Iwo Jima

  • Three-Dimensional Rubber Map of Iwo Jima

  • Three-Dimensional Rubber Map of Iwo Jima

Three-Dimensional Rubber Map of Iwo Jima

Three-dimensional foam rubber map of Iwo Jima: This map was constructed at the Terrain Model Workshop at Camp Bradford, Virginia, prior to the Iwo Jima invasion. Maps like these were fabricated using aerial reconnaissance photographs. They were intended as planning aids for pilots, gunners and infantry who would participate in the invasion of the island. In addition to its strategic importance, Iwo Jima was also a psychological target. Taking this island, which had been in Japanese possession for centuries, would be a major blow to Japanese morale and add to the pressure to surrender. The Americans planned to seize Iwo Jima and then Okinawa in rapid succession before moving on to the Japanese Home Islands. These plans were delayed by the struggle over Iwo, and after the battle for Okinawa, President Truman authorized the use of the atomic bomb rather than approving the invasion of the Japanese main islands.

This map was never sent to the fleet because it was discovered that the Japanese had begun construction on a third airstrip. Lt. Robert Laddish, the executive officer of the Workshop, kept this obsolete version as a souvenir.